פירוש על עבודה זרה 30:16

Huna learns that one might assume that someone will slaughter an animal from a mishnah concerning selling a cow used for plowing on the Sabbatical Year, when plowing is prohibited. Bet Hillel permits it because it is possible that the cow will be used for food instead of for plowing.

Rabbah points out that the cases are not the same. One is not commanded to make sure that one’s cattle rests on the Sabbatical year. It is a prohibition that falls on the person, not on the cattle. But when it comes to Shabbat, one is commanded not to let one’s cattle work on Shabbat. Therefore, Rabbah argues, a Jew cannot sell his animal to an idolater.

Abaye points out that what Rabbah says is not true. Just because one is commanded to make sure that no forbidden work is done with one’s possession does not mean that he cannot sell it to someone who will not observe the commandment. Bet Hillel allows one to sell a field for plowing to a person who might plow it because there is a chance that they will not plow it.

Ashi attacks Rabbah in the opposite direction. Sometimes one is not commanded concerning one’s objects and nevertheless one still cannot sell them to those who will use them to break a commandment. Such is the case with regard to selling plowing instruments during the sabbatical year.

Ashi says that what really matters is whether we can make a reasonable assumption that the item sold will be used to transgress a commandment. It is reasonable to assume that one might decide to slaughter a cow instead of using it for work. This would not be reasonable when it comes to a donkey. It is unlikely that one will use plowing instruments for anything else. Therefore they cannot be sold to one who does not observe the laws of the sabbatical year.
We should note how R. Ashi reverts to simple reason to support R. Huna’s actions. Rabbah on the other hand wanted to find an authoritative source. This may reflect a general shift from tradition as a source of authenticity to logic.

Rabbah defends his sale of a donkey to a Jew known to sell to idolaters by pointing out that it is not certain that the Jew will sell it to an idolater. He might sell it to a Jew.

Abaye uses this long baraita as a (somewhat convoluted) difficulty on Rabbah. The baraita shows that Samaritans are not suspected of bestiality, nor are they suspected of a few other crimes. But nevertheless, there is a custom not to sell them small animals. And when it comes to large animals, the law is always stricter, as we saw in the Mishnah. Abaye thinks it is prohibited to sell large animals to Samaritans because they would sell it to idolaters. So how can Rabbah sell an animal to a Jew known to sell to idolaters?

Abaye uses this long baraita as a (somewhat convoluted) difficulty on Rabbah. The baraita shows that Samaritans are not suspected of bestiality, nor are they suspected of a few other crimes. But nevertheless, there is a custom not to sell them small animals. And when it comes to large animals, the law is always stricter, as we saw in the Mishnah. Abaye thinks it is prohibited to sell large animals to Samaritans because they would sell it to idolaters. So how can Rabbah sell an animal to a Jew known to sell to idolaters?

Yesterday we learned that one can be alone with Samaritans. That means that they are not suspected of being murderers. Nevertheless, a Jew may not sell them weapons. The reason, according to Abaye, is that they will come to sell them to idolaters.

You might think that a Samaritan will definitely not do teshuvah and stop selling weapons to non-Jews, but a Jew known to sell weapons (or other contraband) to non-Jews might stop doing so, and therefore it is permitted to sell weapons to non-Jews known to sell to idolaters. But there is yet another source in which R. Nahman explicitly states that any item that may not be sold to an idolater, may also not be sold to a Jew suspected of selling to an idolater. This is a clear rejection of Rabbah.

Rabbah tries very hard to get the donkey back but he failed. Poor Rabbah, but I guess he at least got some good exercise.

Dimi b. Abba extends the prohibition of selling weapons to Jewish robbers. The Talmud explains that this refers even to a robber not known to murder. The robber referred to here is even one who is sneaky, more of a thief than a robber. The thief may not intend to murder, but if he gets caught, he might commit murder in order to save himself. Therefore, one should not sell weapons to them.

Dimi b. Abba extends the prohibition of selling weapons to Jewish robbers. The Talmud explains that this refers even to a robber not known to murder. The robber referred to here is even one who is sneaky, more of a thief than a robber. The thief may not intend to murder, but if he gets caught, he might commit murder in order to save himself. Therefore, one should not sell weapons to them.

This baraita prohibits even selling defensive shields to non-Jews (although there is a version that allows one to sell them shields).
If it is prohibited to sell them weapons of defense, then it should also be prohibited to sell them food. After all, food is necessary to fend off death. And indeed, this is what Rav holds. If it would be possible to avoid selling food to them, then one should, according to Rav. I should note that this is an extreme opinion—the notion being that one should do whatever one can to avoid aiding non-Jews. It is not representative of the majority of the sages.